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IMMUNIZING INTENTIONAL VIOLATIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS THROUGH JUDICIAL
LEGISLATION: THE EXTENSION OF HARLOW V.
FITZGERALD TO SECTION 1983 ACTIONS
by
Gary S. Gildin*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,"the United States Supreme Court expanded
the qualified immunity available to federal officials sued in Bivens2 actions for violations of constitutional rights. In the six years since the
Harlow decision, the Supreme Court and the federal courts of appeals
have uniformly extended the new immunity rule to civil actions brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983' seeking redress for constitutional violations
caused by state governmental officials. It is the thesis of this Article that,
despite an unwavering line of authority to the contrary, the Harlow immunity does not shield state officials sued under section 1983.
To understand why Harlow cannot govern section 1983 actions, it is
necessary to identify the source of state government officials' immunity
under the statute. On its face, section 1983 does not explicitly establish an
immunity defense. Rather, the statute provides, in pertinent part, that
"[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State ...subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights ... secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
... M'Even though the statute does not expressly set forth any immunity, the Supreme Court has reasoned that Congress, using general language in section 1983, could not have meant to abolish all common law
*

Professor, The Dickinson School of Law; B.A. 1973, University of Wisconsin; J.D. 1976,

Stanford Law School.
1 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
2 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971) (holding that a federal cause of action for which damages are recoverable exists against federal
agents who cause injury while engaging in a violation of consititutional rights).
(1982).
4 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) (emphasis added).
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immunities.' Instead, the Court has presumed that Congress intended to
incorporate the common law immunities when it enacted section 1983
since it failed to abrogate them specifically.'
If the Court's interpretation of the intent of the legislature is accepted,7
then until Congress amends the statute, the qualified immunity of state
officials under section 1983 must parallel the common law immunity standard. As shall be discussed, the qualified immunity defense crafted by the
Court in Harlow admittedly departs from the common law to afford significantly broader protection from liability to government officials who violate the Constitution. Consequently, application of the Harlow immunity
I Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951) ("We cannot believe that Congress... would
impinge on a tradition so well grounded in history and reason by covert inclusion in the language
before us.").
' Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967) ("The legislative record gives no clear indication
that Congress meant to abolish wholesale all common-law immunities.").
7 The Court's supposition that Congress intended to adopt common law immunities arguably
is
inconsistent with the very purpose of § 1983. The legislature created a federal remedy because state
law often failed to afford redress for violations of constitutional rights. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,
174-75 (1961). Congress did not simply intend to federalize state tort law; instead, § 1983 is founded
on the assumption "that a deprivation of a constitutional right is significantly different from and more
serious than a violation of a state right and therefore deserves a different remedy even though the
same act may constitute both a state tort and the deprivation of a constitutional right." Id. at 196
(Harlan, J., concurring). But see Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187 (Section 1983 "should be read against the
background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions."). Interestingly, in common law actions alleging violations of the Constitution, government oflicials were held strictly liable for their transgressions. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 490-91, 507
n.34 (1978) (constitutional violations by federal officials are, by definition, not the valid exercise of
federal authority and are not entitled to immunity).
The presumed inclusion of common law defenses further contradicts the legislature's instruction
that the statute should be liberally construed to afford a remedy for invasions of constitutional rights.
Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 684-85 (1978) ("In both Houses, statements of the
supporters of § 1 corroborated that Congress, in enacting § 1, intended to give a broad remedy for
violations of federally protected civil rights."). See Briscoe v. Lahue, 460 U.S. 325, 348 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Members of the 42d Congress explicitly stated that § 1983 should be read so as
to further its broad remedial goals."); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 561-64 (1967) (Douglas, J,.
dissenting) ("The section's purpose was to provide redress for the deprivation of civil rights.").
Finally, the Supreme Court's reliance on the common law to afford an immunity that the language
of § 1983 does not explicitly confer is at odds with the Court's refusal to borrow common law concepts
in interpreting the cause of action created by § 1983. In Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285
(1980), the Court declined to import state common law duties into § 1983. In Moneli, the Court held
that municipalities and other local governmental entities cannot be held liable on a respondeat superior theory, even though such entities were vicariously liable under tort law at the time § 1983 was
enacted. Moneil, 436 U.S. at 690-91. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 640 (1980)
("As a general rule, it was understood that a municipality's tort liability in damages was identical to
that of private corporations and individuals . . ").
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to section 1983 actions would both contravene congressional intent to import common law immunities and undermine the legislature's goal of affording redress for deprivations of constitutional rights.
II.

THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY STANDARD UNDER SECTION

1983

PRIOR TO HARLOW

The United States Supreme Court first recognized the qualified immunity defense in Piersonv. Ray,' a section 1983 action alleging that municipal police officers had unconstitutionally arrested a group of black and
white clergymen who attempted to use segregated facilities at a Jackson,
Mississippi bus terminal. The court of appeals had ruled that the police
officers could not assert any immunity. Finding that "[t]he legislative record gives no clear indication that Congress meant to abolish wholesale all
common law immunities," 9 the Court reversed, holding that the immunity
defense applicable to a common law action for false arrest and imprisonment was likewise available in a section 1983 action.
While acknowledging qualified immunity for section 1983 actions, the
Court in Pierson was ambiguous in its articulation of the standard for the
immunity. The Court stated that a police officer would be excused from
liability "for acting under a statute that he reasonably believed to be valid
but that was later held unconstitutional," for actions taken in "good faith
and with probable cause," and for "reasonably believ[ing] in good faith
that the arrest was constitutional."'" The Court did not unequivocally indicate whether the immunity test was subjective or objective; nor did it
issue guidance on how to apply the immunity to circumstances beyond
section 1983 claims that aver police officers executed an unconstitutional
arrest.
The Supreme Court next addressed the qualified immunity defense in
Scheuer v. Rhodes," a section 1983 action arising out of the fatal shooting
of three students at Kent State University during an anti-war demonstration. Defendants included the Governor and the Adjutant General of
Ohio, various members of the Ohio National Guard and the University
8 386 U.S.

547 (1967).

0 Id. at 554.
10 Id. at 555, 557.
" 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
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President. The court of appeals had affirmed the district court's dismissal
of the complaint, holding that the executive officials are entitled to absolute immunity for all actions performed within the scope of official duty. 2
The Supreme Court reversed, stating that the executive officials could
avail themselves of a qualified, but not an absolute, immunity to section
1983 liability.1 3 Because of the procedural posture of the case, the Court
did not attempt to define the contours of the qualified immunity of state
executive officials."' The Court did note, however, that evaluating immunity for high level executive officials is more complex than asssessing immunity for line police officers because of the broader range of duties and
authority accorded the former.1 5 The Court then posited the following
general qualified immunity standard for executive officials:
[Iln varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the
executive branch of government, the variation being dependent upon
the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the
circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action
on which liability is sought to be based. It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the
circumstances coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for
qualified immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the
course of official conduct.'"
Although Scheuer strongly suggested that a state official was required
to meet both subjective and objective criteria to be immune, the lower federal courts continued to apply divergent standards. In Wood v. Strick7 the Court granted certiorari to determine whether the qualified
land,"
immunity test for school board members was purely subjective, as the district court contended, or objective, as the court of appeals decided.' In
keeping with the origin of the section 1983 immunity defense, the Court
examined the common law immunity of public school officials. It concluded that while formulations of the immunity varied, "state courts have
generally recognized that such officers should be protected from tort liabil12

Id. at 234-35.

13

Id. at 247-48.

14

Id. at

249.

15 Id. at 245-47.
16 Id. at 247-48.
17

420 U.S. 308 (1975).

18 Id. at 313-14.
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ity under state law for all good-faith, nonmalicious action taken to fulfill
their official duties."19 Relying on the common law, as well as its own

immunity precedents, the Court held that a school board official must satisfy both objective and subjective tests to be immune from liability under
section 1983:
The disagreement between the Court of Appeals and the District
Court over the immunity standard in this case has been put in terms
of an "objective" versus a "subjective" test of good faith. As we see
it, the appropriate standard necessarily contains elements of
both. . . . [W]e hold that a school board member is not immune
from liability for damages under section 1983 if he knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of
official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the
student affected, or if he took the action with the malicious intention
to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the
student.20

In the years between its Wood decision and Harlow v. Fitzgerald," the
Court faithfully hewed to the rule that a state official must satisfy both the
objective and subjective tiers of the qualified immunity to avoid section
1983 liability for constitutional violations.22

19 Id. at 318.
20 Id. at 321-22. The Court also observed that the qualified "immunity from damages does not
ordinarily bar equitable relief as well." Id. at 314 n.6.
21 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
2 Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978) (applying the rule to prison officials); O'Connor
v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (applying the rule to the superintendent of a state mental
hospital).
In Procunier and O'Connor, the Court ignored the source of the qualified immunity defense by
applying the Wood standard without making any inquiry into what immunity was afforded the specific officials at common law. Procunier, 434 U.S. at 568 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Furthermore,
without purporting to overrule or modify Wood, Procunierradically enlarged the circumstances under
which an official would be deemed to satisfy the objective test of the qualified immunity. The expansion of the objective tier is addressed in detail in S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
LITIGATION §§ 8.04, 8.09 (1986).
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EXPANSION OF THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY IN HARLOW V.
FITZGERALD

In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,23 the Supreme Court broadened the protection afforded by the qualified immunity in actions against federal officials
alleged to have infringed constitutionally protected interests. In order to
comprehend Hai-low and to assess whether its holding can be applicable
to state officials sued under section 1983, it is necessary to identify the"
source of the civil immunity of federal officials accused of violating constitutional rights.
A.

Source of the Immunity of Federal Officials

Section 1983 provides a civil cause of action against state, but not federal, officials who violate federal constitutional rights. 24 Congress never
enacted a counterpart to section 1983 to implement a general civil damage
remedy for the constitutional wrongs of persons acting under color of federal law. Faced with the prospect of leaving victims of federal misconduct
remediless, the Supreme Court in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Federal Bureau of Narcotics2 5 implied from the Constitution a civil
cause of action for damages against federal officials who trammel fourth
amendment rights.2" The cause of action introduced in Bivens was not a
- 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
2 Daly-Murphy v. Winston, 837 F.2d 348, 355 (9th Cir. 1987). Federal officers may be sued

under § 1983 when the constitutional violation is the result of a conspiracy between federal and state
actors. Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436, 448 (2d Cir. 1969); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970) (private persons who conspire with state officials act "under color of law"
within the meaning of § 1983).
25 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Bivens involved a civil rights suit against agents of the Federal Bureau
of Narcotics for violations of the fourth amendment. The agents had forced their way into Webster
Bivens' apartment, conducted a warrantless search, and manacled and arrested him in front of his
family for alleged narcotics violations. Id. at 389. A United States commissioner eventually dismissed
the criminal complaint against Bivens.
'0 The reasoning of Bivens was subsequently adopted and applied by the Court to allow a cause
of action against federal officers for violations of other constitutional rights. Carlson v. Green, 446
U.S. 14 (1980) (eighth amendment); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (fifth amendment).
A Bivens action may be precluded when "Congress has provided an alternative remedy which it
explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed as
equally effective." Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18. Similarly, a Bivens action may be defeated by "special
factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action[s] by Congress." Birens, 403 U.S. at
396. See United States v. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. 3054, 3063 (1987) (Bivens remedy unavailable for
injuries that "arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to [military] service."); Bush v.
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product of legislation. To the contrary, Congress's failure to supply a
remedy for the constitutional trespasses of federal officials induced the
Court to establish the cause of action.
Because the court of appeals had not addressed the issue, the Court in
Bivens expressly refused to entertain the question of immunity.2 7 It was
not until 1978, in Butz v. Economou28 that the Court first determined
what immunities insulate federal officials from liability in a Bivens action.
Butz arose out of an action against the United States Secretary of Agriculture and other federal executive officials.29 The complaint maintained
that these officials had unconstitutionally prompted an investigation and
administrative proceeding to revoke or suspend Economou's registration as
a commodities futures commission merchant in retaliation for his criticism
of the Department of Agriculture.3" The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the defendants were absolutely immune for all
discretionary actions within the scope of their authority.3 The court of
appeals reversed, 2 holding that the federal officials were entitled only to
the same qualified immunity that governed state officials sued under section 1983.'3
The Supreme Court rejected the federal officials' blanket claim to absolute immunity.' The Court began its analysis by examining the immunity of employees of the federal government at common law. While the
common law extends absolute immunity to federal officers who act within
Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983) (no Bivens action if Congress has enacted a comprehensive scheme that
affords meaningful remedies); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983) ("[Tjhe unique disciplinary structure of the Military Establishment and Congress' activity in the field constitute 'special
factors' which dictate that it would be inappropriate to provide enlisted military personnel a Bivenstype remedy against their superior officers.").
27 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397-98.
- 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
9 Other individual defendants included the Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, the Judicial Officer and Chief Hearing Examiner, the Administrator of the Commodity Exchange Authority (the
CEA), the Director of the CEA Compliance Division, the Deputy Director of the CEA Registration
and Audit Division, the CEA Regional Administrator for the New York Region, the Agriculture
Department attorney who prosecuted the enforcement proceeding, and several auditors who investigated or served as witnesses against Economou. Id. at 482.
30 Id. at 480-82.
31 Id. at 484.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 485.
4 Id.
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the outer limits of their authority, officers acting beyond their authority
are held strictly liable.3 5 Because a federal official is never authorized to
transgress constitutional limits, the Court concluded that under common
law there would be no immunity for unconstitutional actions."
The Court also relied upon its section 1983 immunity decisions to reject
across-the-board absolute immunity for federal executive officials. Noting
that upper level state executive officers are permitted only a qualified immunity under section 1983, the Court refused to craft a more expansive
immunity for federal executives:
Accordingly, without congressional directions to the contrary, we
deem it untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity
law between suits brought against state officials under § 1983 and
suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials.
The § 1983 action was provided to vindicate federal constitutional
rights. That Congress decided, after the passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment, to enact legislation specifically requiring state officials
to respond in federal court for their failures to observe the constitutional limitations on their powers is hardly a reason for excusing
their federal counterparts for the identical constitutional transgressions. To create a system in which the Bill of Rights monitors more
closely the conduct of state officials than it does that of federal officials is to stand the constitutional design on its head."
Although unwilling to confer absolute immunity upon all members of
the executive branch sued in Bivens actions,3 8 the Court ruled as a matter
of public policy that federal executive officials could invoke the same qualified immunity available to analogous state officers as defined in Scheuer
v. Rhodes.3 9 Thus, to be immune in a Bivens action, a federal executive
35

36

Id. at 489-90.
Id. at 490-91.

37 Id. at 504.

" The Court did hold that absolute immunity would be available in "exceptional situations
where it is demonstrated that absolute immunity is essential for the conduct of the public business."
Id. at 507. Although Secretary of Agriculture Butz was found entitled to only qualified immunity, the
Court accorded absolute immunity to agency officials whose functions were analogous to those of a
judge or a prosecutor. Id. at 514.
39 416 U.S. 232 (1974). The Court apparently did not consider the option of holding federal
officials strictly liable for constitutional violations, even though it agreed that "traditional doctrine did
not accord immunity to officials who transgressed constitutional limits." Butz, 438 U.S. at 507 n.34.
For a discussion of Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), see supra text accompanying notes 11-
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official must both act subjectively in good faith and satisfy the objective
aspect of the defense.
B. Harlow v. Fitzgerald in Bivens Actions

Widening the Scope of Qualified Immunity

The zone of protection afforded federal officials who contravene the
Constitution was broadened by the Court's reformulation of the qualified
4
immunity standard in Harlow v. Fitzgerald.
Respondent A. Ernest
Fitzgerald filed a Bivens action claiming that senior aides and advisers of
the President of the United States conspired to violate his first amendment
rights.4 1 Seeking reversal of the lower federal courts' denial of their motion for summary judgment, petitioners claimed they were entitled to absolute immunity. Although the Court refused to find the federal officials
absolutely immune on the existing record,4 2 it agreed with their contention
that public policy required adjustment of the qualified immunity to facilitate dismissal of meritless Bivens claims prior to trial.4"
In Harlow the Court began its analysis by commenting that in adopting
a qualified, rather than absolute, immunity in Butz v. Economou, the
Court "relied on the assumption that this standard would permit
'[i]nsubstantial lawsuits [to] be quickly terminated.' -44 Under the prevailing qualified immunity standard, however, pre-trial dismissal of Bivens
actions was impeded by the need to consider whether the official acted in
good faith. Because some courts considered the issue of the official's intent
to be a question of fact "inherently requiring resolution by a jury," the
16.
40 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
41 Petitioner Bryce Harlow served both as the Presidential aide principally responsible for con-

gressional relations and as Counselor to the President. Petitioner Alexander Butterfield was employed
as Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief of Staff to H.R. Halderman. Id. at 802-04.
42 The Court reasoned that the factors which mandated denial of blanket absolute immunity to
high level executive officials in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S 478 (1978), "apply with equal force to
this case." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 809. However, the Court allowed that on remand, the White House
aides could be absolutely immune if they proved that the acts in issue "embraced a function so sensitive as to require a total shield from liability." Id. at 813.
In a companion case, the Court held the President of the United States absolutely immune from
liability for damages for all actions "within the 'outer perimeter' of his official responsibility." Nixon
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 756 (1982).
4'Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815.
44 Id. at 814 (quoting Butz, 438 U.S. at 507-08).
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immunity defense often could not be successfully invoked on a motion for
summary judgment.45 Consequently, innocent federal officials, and the
government in general, were burdened with what the Court assumed were
substantial social costs of litigating the state-of-mind issue, namely, "distraction of officials from their governmental duties, inhibition of discretionary action, and deterrence of able people from public service." 4
In order to remove the perceived barrier to dismissal of Bivens actions
prior to trial, the Court modified the qualified immunity standard by
eliminating the condition that the official must act in subjective good faith
47
to be immune:
Consistently with the balance at which we aimed in Butz, we condude today that bare allegations of malice should not suffice to subject government officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens
of broad-reaching discovery. We therefore hold that government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.48
45 Id. at 816.
41 Id. at 816. The Court asserted that determining the official's intent was especially disruptive

because "there often is no clear end to the relevant evidence," and resolution of the issue frequently
necessitated "broad-ranging discovery and the deposing of numerous persons, including an official's
professional colleagues." Id. at 817.
47 The Court also reiterated the pro-defendant application of the objective tier of the qualified
immunity which it had adopted in Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978). If the right was not
dearly established at the time of the violation, the official is automatically immune. Harlow, 457 U.S.
at 818. On the other hand, if the right infringed was clearly established, the official may still successfully plead the immunity defense if he "claims extraordinary circumstances and can prove that he
neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal standards." Id. at 819.
48 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817-18. In addition to abrogating the subjective aspect of the qualified
immunity, the Court altered the ordinary application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for
Bivens actions. Most courts have interpreted FED. R. Civ. P. 56 to preclude an award of summary
judgment until the party opposing the entry of judgment has had a full and fair opportunity to conduct discovery. See 6 J. MOORE & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 56.15(5) (2d ed.
1988) ("The party opposing summary judgment must be given a reasonable opportunity to gain access
to proof, particularly where the facts are largely within the knowledge or control of the moving
party."). The Court in Harlow, however, admonished that discovery "should not be allowed" until
the court determines on a motion for summary judgment whether it was clearly established at the time
of the alleged violation that the Constitution proscribed the official's conduct. Harlow, 457 U.S. at
818. See Dale v. Bartels, 552 F. Supp. 1253, 1266 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff d in part and rev'd in
part, 732 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1984) ("[R]easonableness of challenged intentional conduct is not the sort
of issue which can be resolved by affidavit, especially in suits in which there has been no pre-trial
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After Harlow, even if a federal officer intended to harm the plaintiff, he
is immune if the constitutional interest in issue was not clearly established
at the time of the violation.49
IV.
A.

THE EXTENSION OF HARLOW TO SECTION

1983 ACTIONS

Post-Harlow Decisions

The Court acknowledged that because Harlow arose out of the activities of federal officials, the "case involves no issue concerning the elements
of the immunity available to state officials sued for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.''50 Although the question has never been
formally posed, the Supreme Court repeatedly has presumed that the expanded Harlow immunity applies to section 1983 actions. The Court's
extension of Harlow to section 1983 is founded in footnote thirty of the
Harlow opinion. At the same time that it admitted that the Harlow case
does not concern the immunity defense of state officials sued under section
1983, the Court volunteered: "We have found previously, however, that it
would be 'untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law
between suits brought against state officials under § 1983 and suits
brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials.' ",'
Four days after its Harlow opinion, the Supreme Court again suggested
that it considered the broadened immunity of federal officials equally applicable to actions against state officials under section 1983. The Court
vacated and remanded the decision of the Sixth Circuit in Wolfel v.
Sanborn in which two state parole officers who had been sued under secdiscovery. In suggesting that such a finding may be made at an early stage in the typical Bivens case,
the Harlow opinion flies in the face of longstanding authority to the contrary ....").
" The subjective intent of the defendant may remain relevant to the immunity analysis when the
constitutionality of the defendant's conduct depends on the purpose for which the actions were taken.
Gutierrez v. Mun. Ct., 838 F.2d 1031, 1051 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[I]n deciding whether a defendant is
entitled to qualified immunity, in cases in which unlawful motive is a critical element, the court must
consider the actor's intent . . . ."); Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 26-29 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985).
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion suggested that the official who knows that he was violating
the Constitution would be liable "even if he could not 'reasonably have been expected' to know what
he actually did know." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 821. Under Justice Brennan's standard, "some measure
of discovery may sometimes be required to determine exactly what a public official defendant did
'know' at the time of his actions." Id.
'o Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 n.30.
' Id. (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978)).
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tion 1983 unsuccessfully asserted a qualified immunity defense.2 In its
order remanding the case "for further consideration in light of Harlow,"
the Court cited Butz as deeming untenable "a distinction for purposes of
immunity law between suits brought against state officials under Sec.
1983 and suits brought directly under the Consitution against federal
officials."" 3
Predictably, the court of appeals, relying solely on footnote thirty of
Harlow, construed the remand order to mean that the expanded Harlow
qualified immunity applied to suits under section 1983.""
The first section 1983 qualified immunity case to reach the Supreme
Court after Harlow was Davis v. Scherer.55 In Davis, the Court was
asked to decide whether state administrative regulations could be considered in evaluating whether a state official had violated clearly established
federal constitutional rights. While the issue in Davis concerned only the
objective aspect of the qualified immunity, the plaintiff did not question
that the Harlow standard controlled his section 1983 action. 6 The Supreme Court reiterated that "our cases have recognized that the same
qualified immunity rules apply in suits against state officers under § 1983
and in suits against federal officers under Bivens ... ,

In Malley v. Briggs,58 the Supreme Court echoed its belief that section
1983 actions are governed by the Harlow immunity. The Court was confronted with the immunity plea of a state police officer defending a section
1983 suit. The plaintiffs averred that the officer caused their unconstitutional arrest by presenting the judge with a complaint and a supporting
affidavit that failed to establish probable cause. Rejecting the police officer's claim to absolute immunity, the Court, citing Harlow, stated that
under its own precedents, "qualified immunity represents the norm."5' 9 In
a footnote to its citation of Harlow, the Court repeated the familiar foot:2

666 F.2d 1005 (6th Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 458 U.S. 1102 (1982).

,' Sanborn v. Wolfel, 458 U.S. 1102 (1982) (mem.) (citation omitted) (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978)).
" Wolfel v. Sanborn, 691 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1115 (1983).
" 468 U.S. 183 (1984).
Id. at 193. See Brief for Appellee at 21, 27-33, Davis, 468 U.S. 183 (1984) (No. 83-490).
Id. at 194 n.12.
475 U.S. 335 (1986). As in Davis, plaintiff conceded that the Harlow immunity standard
governed § 1983 actions. Brief for Respondent at 27-31, Malley, 475 U.S. 335 (1986) (No. 84-1586).
" Malley, 475 U.S. at 340 (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807).
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note thirty: "Harlow was a suit against federal, not state, officials, but as
we stated in deciding the case, it is 'untenable to draw a distinction for
purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state officials
under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against
federal officials.' "6o
The Court further evidenced its acceptance of a purely objective immunity test for section 1983 suits when it repudiated the police officer's contention that policy considerations mandated that the officer receive absolute immunity:
As the qualified immunity defense has evolved, it provides ample
protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law.... The Harlow standard is specifically designed to
"avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution
of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment," and we believe it sufficiently serves this goal. Defendants will not be immune
if, on an objective basis, it is obvious that no reasonably competent
officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue; but if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on this issue, immunity should be recognized. 6
Thus, the Court in Malley clearly expressed its understanding that
the
62
objective Harlow immunity applies equally to section 1983 actions.
Relying on footnote thirty of the Harlow opinion, the Supreme Court,
without hesitation, has accepted that the Harlow immunity standard governs section 1983 suits against state officials. 6 Examination of the ration60Id. at 340 n.2 (quoting the portion of Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 n.30, that quotes Butz v.
Economou 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978)).
*' Id. at 341.
62 In Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3038-41 (1987), the Court repeatedly referred to
Malley in defining the immunity applicable to Bivens actions, further manifesting its assumption that
the immunity of state and federal officials is identical in the aftermath of Harlow.See Oklahoma City
v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 812 n.1 (1985).
63 Similarly, the federal appeals courts uniformly have held Harlow applicable to § 1983 actions.
Brown v. Ponte, 842 F.2d 16, 18 (1st Cir. 1988); Krause v. Penny, 837 F.2d 595, 597 (2d Cir. 1988);
Bennis v. Gable, 823 F.2d 723, 732-33 (3d Cir. 1987); L.J. ex rel. Darr v. Massinga, 838 F.2d 118,
124 (4th Cir. 1988); Page v. DeLaune, 837 F.2d 233, 239 (5th Cir. 1988); Stern v. Shouldice, 706
F.2d 742, 749 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 993 (1983); Greenberg v. Kmetko, 840 F.2d 467, 472
(7th Cir. 1988); Buller v. Buechler, 706 F.2d 844, 850 (8th Cir. 1983); Schlegel v. Bebout, 841 F.2d
937, 944 (9th Cir. 1988); Griess v. Colorado, 841 F.2d 1042, 1047 (10th Cir. 1988); Clark v. Evans,
840 F.2d 876, 879-80 (11th Cir. 1988).
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ale underlying footnote thirty, however, reveals that it does not support
extension of Harlow to section 1983.
B. Footnote Thirty of the Harlow Opinion Does Not Support Extension
of the Expanded Immunity to Section 1983
Footnote thirty of Harlow improperly premises extension of the expanded immunity to section 1983 actions upon the following syllogism:
1. In Butz v. Economou, the Court reasoned that the
immunity of federal officials from constitutional
damage claims should be coextensive with the immunity
of state officials.
2. Harlow established that to be immune, federal
officials must fulfill an objective test, but need not
establish subjective good faith.
3. Therefore, to have the same immunity as federal
officials, state officials need only satisfy the
objective Harlow test.
The reasoning is facially unassailable, which no doubt accounts for its
universal acceptance by the Supreme Court and lower federal courts.
However, in refashioning the qualified immunity for federal officials in
Harlow, the Court violated the syllogism upon which it now relies to confer the Harlow immunity upon state officials.
At the time Harlow was decided, it was settled that state officials must
satisfy both an objective and subjective test to escape liability under section
1983." To be faithful to the proposition that federal and state officials
must share an identical immunity, the Court could not have adopted a
purely objective test for federal officials. When it made the policy judgment to abrogate the subjective tier of the immunity in Harlow, the Court
abandoned the leading premise of its syllogism - that the immunity of
federal officials, must be no greater than the immunity of state officers.
Thus it cannot justify extending the new immunity to section 1983 actions
simply by resurrecting the syllogism it disregarded in Harlow.
" See supra Part II.
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C. The Qualified Immunity, as Modified in Harlow, Departsfrom the
Common Law Standard
Apart from the flawed logic that underlies the Court's application of
Harlow to section 1983, extension of the new immunity contravenes the
Court's settled holdings that immunity under section 1983 is founded in
the common law.
As discussed earlier, the qualified immunity defense to section 1983 liability originated in the Supreme Court's presumption that, by failing to
manifest an affirmative intent to abrogate common law immunities, Congress incorporated these immunities when it enacted section 1983.65
Prior to Harlow, the Court insisted that the common law required an
official to satisfy both a subjective and objective test to merit immunity.
When Harlow abolished the subjective prong of the test, it departed from
the common law immunity standard. Consequently, application of
Harlow to section 1983 actions would be contrary to congressional intent
to merge common law immunities into the statute.
The Harlow opinion did not pretend to tie its widening of the qualified
immunity to a parallel expansion of the common law defense for government officials,6 6 but instead rested entirely on the Court's perception of
the demands of public policy. In fact, in Malley v. Briggs the Court admitted that the Harlow immunity diverges from the common law:
At common law, in cases where probable cause to arrest was lacking, a complaining witness's immunity turned on the issue of malice,
which was a jury question. Under the Harlow standard, on the
other hand, an allegation of malice is not sufficient to defeat immunity if the defendant acted in an objectively reasonable manner.6
In Anderson v. Creighton, s the Court issued an even more resounding
concession that the Harlow immunity is not anchored in a common law
analog. Anderson was a Bivens action stemming from a warrantless
search by FBI agents hunting for a fugitive. Rejecting as procrustean the
e See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
" The Court has divided over whether it may, when interpreting the statute, utilize developments in the common law which followed enactment of § 1983. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983).
67 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (footnote omitted).
" 107 S. Ct. 3034 (1987).
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plaintiffs' assertion that the FBI agents could not advance a qualified immunity defense because officers conducting comparable fugitive searches
were strictly liable at common law, Justice Scalia reasoned:
[W]e have never suggested that the precise contours of official immunity can and should be slavishly derived from the often arcane
rules of the common law. That notion is plainly contradicted by
Harlow, where the Court completely reformulated qualified immunity along principles not at all embodied in the common law, replacing the inquiry into subjective malice so frequently required at common law with an objective inquiry into the legal reasonableness of
the official action.6 9
The Court may be at liberty to ignore the common law in crafting the
qualified immunity for Bivens actions, which are not derived from an act
of Congress. On the other hand, the Court is not free to supplant the
legislature's intent to incorporate common law immunities into section
1983 merely because the Court believes public policy demands more generous protection of government officials."0
Indeed, the Court itself has confessed that it is powerless to substitute
its policy judgment for the will of Congress in determining immunities
under section 1983. In Tower v. Glover,7 the Court held that a public
defender sued under section 1983 could not assert any immunity because
the defense was not available at common law for the actions in question.
The Court rejected the defendant's contention that the Court should recognize an immunity for policy reasons notwithstanding the absence of a
common law analog:
Finally, petitioners contend that public defenders have responsibilities similar to those of a judge or prosecutor, and therefore should
enjoy similar immunities. The threat of § 1983 actions based on alleged conspiracies among defense counsel and other state officials
may deter counsel from engaging in activities that require some degree of cooperation with prosecutors - negotiating pleas, expediting
6' Id. at 3041-42.
70 See Briscoe v. Lahue, 460 U.S. 325, 364 n.33 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[W]e should be even
more reluctant to import absolute immunity into § 1983 suits than into Bivens actions.... [W]ith §
1983, we deal with explicit statutory language indicating the broad scope of the action, whereas Bivens actions have been implied by the federal courts.").
71 467 U.S. 914 (1984).
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trials and appeals, and so on. Ultimately, petitioners argue, the
State's attempt to meet its constitutional obligation to furnish criminal defendants with effective counsel will be impaired. At the same
time, the federal courts may be inundated with frivolous lawsuits.
Petitioners' concerns may be well founded, but the remedy petitioners urge is not for us to adopt. We do not have a license to
establish immunities from § 1983 actions in the interests of what
we judge to be sound public policy. It is for Congress to determine
whether § 1983 litigation has become too burdensome to state or
federal institutions and, if so, what remedial action is
appropriate2
Ironically, at the same time that the Court assumed that Harlow would
apply to section 1983, in Malley v. Briggs,7 3 it emphasized that interpretation of the statute was constrained by Congress's intent to incorporate
common law immunities. Dismissing the police officer's claim to absolute
immunity, the Court stated:
We reemphasize that our role is to interpret the intent of Congress
in enacting § 1983, not to make a free-wheeling policy choice, and
that we are guided in interpreting Congress' intent by the commonlaw tradition. In Imbler we concluded that at common law "[tihe
general rule was, and is, that a prosecutor is absolutely immune
from suit for malicious prosecution." We do not find a comparable
tradition of absolute immunity for one whose complaint causes a
warrant to issue. While this observation may seem unresponsive to
petitioner's policy argument, it is, we believe, an important guide to
interpreting § 1983. Since the statute on its face does not provide for
any immunities, we would be going far to read into it an absolute
immunity for conduct which was only accorded qualified immunity
4
in 1871.7
The Supreme Court's section 1983 precedents expressly disavow any
71

Id. at 922-23 (emphasis added). See also Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 539-40 (1984)

("Absent some basis for determining that such a result [absolute judicial immunity in actions for
equitable relief] is compelled, either by the principles of judicial immunity, derived from the common
law and not explicitly abrogated by Congress, or by Congress' own intent to limit the relief available
under § 1983, we are unwilling to impose those limits ourselves on the remedy Congress provided.").
73 475 U.S. 335 (1986)..
"' Id. at 342 (citations omitted) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 457 (1976)).
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power to expand the qualified immunity beyond the common law standards intended by Congress. Extension of Harlow to section 1983 would
impermissibly substitute the Court's policy evaluation for the Court's own
understanding of the will of Congress. Such judicial legislation is particularly egregious because, as shall next be discussed, the policy judgment of
the Court is at odds with the purpose and general rule of construction of
section 1983.
V.
SUITS

APPLICATION OF THE HARLOW IMMUNITY TO SECTION

IS

1983

CONTRARY TO THE PURPOSE AND PROPER CONSTRUCTION
OF THE STATUTE

Section 1983 was designed both to deter violations of the Constitution
and to afford compensation to individuals who suffer invasions of constitutional rights.7 5 As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, members of the
enacting Congress expressly prescribed that the statute should be liberally
construed to afford relief for constitutional wrongs."' The Court did not
augment the relief available to victims of constitutional deprivations when
it rewrote the qualified immunity standard in Harlow; instead, the Court
enlarged the circumstances under which government officials may evade
liability for the harm caused by their unconstitutional conduct. Consequently, applying the expanded immunity countenanced by Harlow to
suits under section 1983 would contravene the purpose and proper construction of the statute."
By abolishing the subjective portion of the immunity inquiry, Harlow
exonerates officials who otherwise would be liable for intentional infliction
of constitutional harm."8 Under the subjective prong, immunity is denied
Owen v. City of*Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650-52 (1980).
Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 685-86 (1978).
7 The Supreme Court has noted that even if the common law afforded immunity, "the Court
next considers whether § 1983's history or purposes nonetheless counsel against recognizing the same
immunity in § 1983 actions." Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920 (1984). See Owen, 445 U.S. at 65052 (1980).
78 See S. NAHMOD, supra note 22, § 8.04 at 460 (footnotes omitted):
Because the two-part test had an additional hurdle, it would seem to follow that defendants
were more often held liable under the two-part test than they will be under the modified
objective test. Consequently, there will be more situations under the modified test than
there were under the prior two-part test in which defendants violate constitutional rights
with no remedy for plaintiffs. These unremedied violations impose costs on society which
have not been, and perhaps cannot be, measured satisfactorily. Such costs include disrespect
75

76
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to any official who acted "with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury. "" Under Harlow, however,
intent is irrelevant to the immunity analysis. Even if the officer meant to
harm the plaintiff, he is immune if the constitutional right violated was
not "clearly established" at the time of his actions.8"
The likelihood that a governmental official will be immunized for intentional wrongs simply because the right infringed was not clearly established has been markedly expanded by the post-Harlow decisions of the
Supreme Court. In Davis v. Scherer,8 ' the Court held that if the federal
constitutional right violated was not clearly established, the official is immune even when state statutes and regulations unambiguously prohibit
his actions.82 Most recently, in Anderson v. Creighton,"3 the Court held
that a right does not become clearly established solely by virtue of general
declarations or definitions of the right. Instead, immunity is denied only if
the right was clearly established in circumstances similar to the particular
facts of the case in issue:
The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable
official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.
This is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified
immunity unless the very action in question has previously been
held unlawful; but it is to say that in light of preexisting law the
unlawfulness must be apparent ....

The relevant question in this

case, for example, is the objective (albeit fact-specific) question
whether a reasonable officer could have believed Anderson's warrantless search to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and
the information the searching officers possessed."
for authority, disrespect for the Constitution and laws generally, the erosion of Fourteenth
Amendment values, and the prospect that some executives might be undeterred in connection with Fourteenth Amendment compliance. There are also, of course, costs to the individual, such as the actual harm caused and the feeling of being victimized.
'g Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1974).
0 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
8 468 U.S. 183 (1984).
92 Davis does not conform to the objective aspect of the immunity as originally defined in
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974), in which the Court stated, "[i]t is the existence of
reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances coupled
with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity .... " (emphasis added).
83 107 S. Ct. 3034 (1987).
84 Id. at 3039-40 (citations omitted). See also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 535
n.12 (1985)
("We do not intend to suggest that an official is always immune from liability or suit for a warrantless
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It is unclear how proximate the facts of the relevant precedent cases
must be to the case in question before a court will find that the constitutional right was clearly established.8 5 In Davis v. Scherer,88 the Court
held that the failure to afford any hearing prior to termination of a state
employee did not violate clearly established law. Even though the decisions of the Supreme Court had required some kind of hearing, the Court
had not specified "any minimally acceptable procedures for termination of
employment." 8 If Davis foretells the Court's disposition to demand a
high degree of factual correlation to precedent cases before a right is
deemed clearly established, the instances of government officials escaping
liability for intentional harm under*the Harlow standard will greatly increase. By expanding the immunity in a manner that shields what is arguably the most egregious official misconduct, Harlow defeats the purpose
of section 1983.88
search merely because the warrant requirement has never explicitly been held to apply to a search
conducted in identical circumstances. But in cases where there is a legitimate question whether an
exception to the warrant requirement exists, it cannot be said that a warrantless search violates clearly
established law.").
85Compare Muhammad v. Wainwright, 839 F.2d 1422, 1424 (11th Cir. 1987) (finding right
not to be dearly established because general standard had not been applied to analogous concrete
facts) with Savidge v. Fincannon, 836 F.2d 898, 908-09 (5th Cir. 1988) ("We reject any approach to
immunity doctrine that requires us to imagine the defendants saying to themselves, 'We can safely
give Jonathan Savidge inadequate treatment; he was not committed to the FWSS through formal
judicial proceedings and so the rationale in Wyatt may not apply to him.' We simply do not envision
reasonable doctors and administrators calibrating their responsibility to each child on the basis of such
narrow distinctions." (footnotes omitted)).
Commentators have suggested that this particular area remains a thorny one for the courts. See
Comment, Harlow v. Fitzgerald: The Lower Courts Implement the New Standardfor Qualified
Immunity Under Section 1983, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 901 (1984). See also Note, Quick Terminationof
InsubstantialCivil Rights Claims: Qualified Immunity and ProceduralFairness,38 VAND. L. REV.
1543, 1553 n.44 (1985). "Commentators have suggested three general approaches: (1) to require strict
factual correspondence between the precedent case and the instant case; (2) to require that officials
apply general legal principles in analogous factual situations; or (3) to require that officials anticipate
discernible trends in the law." Id.
88 468 U.S. 183 (1984).
87 Id. at 192 n.10.
88 Harlow and its progeny also increase the cost of pursuing relief for constitutional wrongs. In
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985), the Court interpreted Harlow to establish that the
qualified immunity "is an immunityfrom suit rather than a mere defense to liability." Therefore, the
Court held, denial of a pre-trial motion seeking dismissal of a lawsuit on the basis of the qualified
immunity is an immediately appealable final decision within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982).
Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 530. Consequently, a civil rights plaintiff can expect to endure the expense and
delay of a motion to dismiss, as well as an immediate appeal should the motion be denied, even before
commencing discovery. See id. at 556 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part) ("[Tloday's decision will give
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The Court's reformulation of the qualified immunity in Harlow is
based solely on the Court's appraisal of the social costs imposed on government by the litigation of federal civil rights actions. Interestingly, the
Court cited no statistics regarding either the presumed inability of federal
officials to secure dismissal of Bivens actions before trial or the extensive
discovery which the Court assumed that determination of the subjective
motivation of the government actor entails.8 ' Nor did the Court in Harlow
examine existing empirical data concerning the extent to which the thengovernment officials a potent weapon to use against plaintiffs, delaying litigation endlessly with interlocutory appeals. The Court's decision today will result in denial of full and speedy justice to those
plaintiffs with strong claims on the merits and a relentless and unnecessary increase in the caseload of
the appellate courts." (footnote omitted)). At least one court has construed Mitchell to sanction two
appeals before trial - one appeal from denial of a motion to dismiss on the pleadings prior to discovery and a second appeal from denial of a motion for summary judgment after discovery. Kennedy v.
City of Cleveland, 797 F.2d 297, 299 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1 (1987). Contra Kaiter
v. Town of Boxford, 836 F.2d 704, 707-08 (1st Cir. 1988).
89 Most of the available statistics concerning the pre-Harlom period belie the Court's supposition
that government officials were unable to avoid the costs of discovery and trial in civil rights litigation.
A study of § 1983 cases filed in 1975 and 1976 in the Central District of California found that of 276
non-prisoner cases filed, depositions were conducted in 56 cases and only 17 cases went to trial. Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 482,
550-53 (1982). Of the 212 prisoner § 1983 claims filed in the same period, depositions were conducted
in 5 cases and 3 cases proceeded to trial. Id. at 554.
An empirical analysis of prisoner § 1983 suits in five federal districts in 1975-1977 concluded:
Few prisoners attempted to conduct discovery, and still fewer successfully obtained any
discovery. Hardly any of the cases went to trial. Only 18 of the 664 cases studied had
either an evidentiary hearing or a trial. A grand total of forty-four court days over a twoand-one-half-year period were spent on the cases studied.
Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of PrisonerSection 1983 Suits in the Federal Courts, 92
HARv. L. REv. 610, 624 (1979). The Court relied on this study in Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S.
193 (1985), in discrediting the claim that absolute immunity of members of a prison disciplinary
committee is required to avoid procedural burdens and expense of litigation.
A third empirical study reviewed prisoner § 1983 cases filed in the Northern District of Illinois in
1971 and 1973. Bailey, The Realities of Prisoners' Cases Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: A Statistical
Survey in the Northern District of Illinois, 6 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 527 (1975). Of 218 cases filed in
1971, all but 22 were summarily dismissed. Depositions were conducted in only nine cases and hearings were held in only seven. Id. at 551. Of the 173 cases filed in 1973, all but 36 were summarily
dismissed. Depositions were taken in 7 cases and hearings were held in 22. Id. at 552.
The most recent evaluation of § 1983 and Bivens litigation in the Central District of California in
1980 and 1981 found that "discovery events occur somewhat more often in nonprisoner constitutional
tort cases" and that "jludges are somewhat more likely to have a pretrial conference or conduct a trial
in a constitutional tort case." Eisenberg & Schwab, The Reality of ConstitutionalTort Litigation, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 641, 675 (1987). The authors cautioned, however, that their conclusions were
limited to a single district and suggested "that decision makers demand evidence to support assertions
about constitutional tort cases, and that they not act in the empirical void that has dominated discussion to date." Id. at 695.
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prevailing qualified immunity standard foreclosed redress for injuries
caused by unconstitutional conduct of government officials." While adjustment of the qualified immunity standard facilitated the defendant's
ability to procure dismissal of Bivens actions prior to discovery and trial,
the Court's decision in Harlow erected a significant additional obstacle to
bona fide victims seeking to remedy the violation of their constitutional
rights. The Court's ipse dixit that "[t]he public interest in deterrence of
unlawful conduct and in compensation of victims remains protected by a
test that focuses on the objective legal reasonableness of an official's
acts," 9' 1 cannot erase the new barrier to relief imposed by the expanded
immunity. As such, Harlow is inconsistent with the legislature's charge
that section 1983 should be liberally construed to further its remedial
purposes.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's public policy judgment in Harlow resulted in a
new qualified immunity standard that deviates from the common law immunity of government officials and serves to make it more difficult to obtain redress for constitutional harms. Consequently, the Harlow rule,
when applied to section 1983 actions, contradicts what the Court proclaimed to be Congress's intent to incorporate common law immunities
into section 1983, as well as Congress's instruction to liberally construe
" A 1979 study of all reported Bivens cases found that plaintiffs had prevailed in only 5 of 136
cases in which judgment was entered. Note, "Damages or Nothing" - The Efficacy of the BivensType Remedy, 64 CORNELL L. REv. 667, 694 (1979). In 51 of the 131 cases in which defendants
prevailed, judgment was based upon an individual immunity. Id. at 695.
A project assessing the viability of § 1983 suits against police in Connecticut concluded "that suits
in the sample brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 did not compensate plaintiffs for violations of their
constitutional rights or deter police officers from engaging in proscribed behavior." Project, Suing the
Police in Federal Court, 88 YALE L.J. 781, 814 (1979). Among the solutions proposed by the authors
was elimination of the qualified immunity defense. Id. at 815-16.
Other studies, while not isolating the qualified immunity defense, similarly found that plaintiffs
fared poorly in § 1983 litigation. Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 89, at 677 ("Constitutional tort
plaintiffs do worse than non-civil rights litigants in every measurable way."); Eisenberg, supra note
89, at 527 ("The available information suggests that there is not a large-scale shift of public funds to
§ 1983 plaintiffs."); Turner, supra note 89, at 624 ("Permanent relief was practically never granted.
In our 664-case sample, 3 injunctions were granted; minimal damages were awarded in 2 E.D. Va.
cases but no others."); Bailey, supra note 89, at 531 (Prisoners obtained judicial relief in 4 out of 218
cases.).
"1Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819.
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the statute to afford a remedy for deprivation of constitutional rights
caused by persons acting under color of state law. The Supreme Court has
not and cannot explain how its assessment of public policy can supplant
the expressed will of the legislature. Until Congress amends the statute,
Harlow may not extend to suits under section 1983.

